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AKP at the Crossroads: Erdog˘an’s
Majoritarian Drift
Ergun O¨zbudun
The cleavage between the secular centre and the religious-conservative periphery has been
the most important dividing line in modern Turkish politics. In the past, centre-right
parties have successfully appealed to the peripheral majority, emerging as victors in almost
all parliamentary elections since 1950. This trend continues with the Justice and
Development Party (AKP). In power since 2002, winner of three consecutive elections with
increasing majorities, the AKP qualifies as a predominant party. The article focuses on the
AKP’s recent drift towards an excessively majoritarian conception of democracy, or even
an electoral authoritarianism of a more markedly Islamic character. Topics discussed
include the Gezi Park events in May–June 2013, the conflict with the Gu¨len movement,
corruption charges against government ministers, recent legislation weakening judicial
independence and restricting freedom of expression, and the 30 March 2014 local
elections.
Keywords: Turkey; Islamism; Conservatism; Gezi Park; Majoritarianism; Authoritar-
ianism; Delegative Democracies
The cleavage between the secular centre and the religious-conservative periphery has
been the most important dividing line in modern Turkish politics. In the past,
centre-right parties have successfully appealed to the peripheral majority and emerged
as victors in almost all parliamentary elections since 1950. This trend continues
with the present governing party AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi – Justice and
Development Party) with the important difference that its top leadership cadres came
from Islamic roots. Nevertheless, the AKP presented itself not as an Islamist but as a
conservative democratic party and successfully built a coalition that includes not only
the hard-core Islamists but also various shades of conservative and nationalist voters.
Understandably, this coalitional character has led to conflicting evaluations of the
nature of the AKP and its future course of action. Thus, the conclusion to William
Hale and Ergun O¨zbudun’s 2010 book on the AKP was as follows:
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Summing up, it appeared that at the beginning of 2009 the AKP was at a crossroads.
It might either return to its old policy of vigorously pursuing the reformist path with
the ultimate aim of becoming an EU [European Union] member, or to compromise
with the state elites and accept the status quo perhaps with some minor
improvements . . . It was still unclear which way the cat would jump. Clearly, the
story of the AKP was far from finished, although its future was quite uncertain.
(Hale & O¨zbudun 2010, p. 158)
The question is even more valid today than in 2009. Furthermore, there are now
several more directions in which the cat may jump. One is a drift to some kind of
electoral authoritarianism of a more markedly Islamic character. The second is
the break-up of the AKP coalition, which may lead to a split within the party, or at
least to a significant weakening of its electoral support. The latter may not necessarily
mean losing power, but it may mean the party’s loss of its present ‘predominant’
party status.
These new scenarios are the outcome of the AKP’s third and present term in
power. The AKP came to power in 2002 with 34.3 per cent of the vote and then
increased its vote share to 46.6 per cent in 2007 and 49.8 per cent in 2011. In all
three parliamentary elections, it won close to two-thirds of the seats in the
Grand National Assembly: 66 per cent in 2002, 62 per cent in 2007, and 59.3 per cent in
2011. In 2002 and 2011 it won almost twice, and in 2007 more than double, the
votes of the second-largest party, the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – Republican
People’s Party). Such scores easily qualify it as a ‘predominant party’ (O¨zbudun 2013a,
pp. 97–99).
Together with its growing electoral popularity, the 2010 constitutional amendments
also marked an important step in the AKP’s consolidation of power. The amendments,
adopted by 58 per cent of the popular vote in a highly polarised referendum, broke the
monopoly of the secularist judges in both the Constitutional Court and the High
Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors (HSYK), the body responsible for all career
matters for judges and public prosecutors. Prior to the 2010 amendments, the HSYK
was dominated by judges chosen by the two high courts (the Court of Cassation and
the Council of State), both with markedly secularist tendencies. The Constitutional
Court displayed similar characteristics. Thus, the judiciary exercised a strong tutelary
control over the AKP government and its conservative policies. The constitutional
amendments of 2010 gave both the HSYK and the Constitutional Court a more
representative and pluralistic structure, thus weakening their tutelary control over the
elected government (O¨zbudun 2011, pp. 103–107). The amendments also narrowed
the domain of military privileges and immunities. Thus, the competence to try crimes
committed by military personnel against the constitutional order of the state was
transferred from military to civilian courts, making it possible to prosecute and try a
large number of active or retired military officers on allegations of preparing plans
for a military coup. In sum, the constitutional amendments significantly weakened
the possibility of challenges to the AKP government from the military and/or the
judiciary.
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The Growing Trend towards Conservatism
These developments seem to have emboldened the AKP leadership to pursue a more
markedly conservative and majoritarian line. Prime Minister Erdog˘an’s increasing
references to Islamic themes such as his promise to raise ‘pious generations’, the
introduction of more Islamic themes – on an optional basis – into the school
curricula, his statements against abortion, his insulting words about alcohol drinkers
and unmarried boy and girl students sharing the same house are cases in point. These
were accompanied by a law intended to restrict alcohol consumption. Although the
law does not prohibit the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages, it bans their
advertisement in the printed and visual media, their consumption in public picnic
areas, and the sponsorship of cultural and sports events by alcohol-producing
companies. Interestingly, while some AKP spokespersons tried to justify the alcohol
law on the basis of public health arguments, Erdog˘an defended it with reference to
religious injunctions: ‘Is there anything wrong with pursuing a policy ordered by
religion?’ (Milliyet 2013a). In the words of a Turkish columnist, the aim of such
policies seems to be not Islamisation per se, but the ‘ghettoisation’ of the secular way of
life, to make it less publicly visible (Uluengin 2013).
Perhaps more than the substance of the AKP’s recent policies, it is the angry,
condescending, and authoritarian tone of Erdog˘an’s statements that aggravates
concern within the secular sectors. Similarly, his recent speeches reflect an excessively
majoritarian or even plebiscitarian conception of democracy, as he has come to
emphasise more and more the support of the 50 per cent behind him, ignoring the
feelings of the other 50 per cent. He sees the ‘ballot box’ as the only legitimate
instrument of accountability in a democracy and describes the anti-government
demonstrations as an attempt by the minority to impose its will on the majority by
unlawful means.
This was precisely the reaction Erdog˘an and his government showed to the Gezi
Park (Taksim Square) events that shook Turkey for almost the entire month of June
2013. The events started as a seemingly innocent environmentalist protest against the
cutting down of a number of trees in the park area, evidently with the intention of
building a huge shopping centre there. By all accounts, the majority of the original
protestors were peaceful, well-educated, mostly non-political, middle-class young
people (Bilgic and Kafkaslı 2013). Later on, however, the demonstrations were
joined by violent marginal groups, partly as a reaction to the police brutality and the
disproportionate use of force, and partly for more ideological reasons. Consequently,
in parts of I˙stanbul and some other cities, violent clashes with the police took place,
resulting in five deaths, thousands of injuries and detentions, and the destruction of
public and private property (S¸ardan 2013).
Obviously, the Gezi Park events cannot be reduced to pure and simple
environmentalist concerns. Rather, they were the spontaneous explosion of
accumulated anxieties resulting from what was perceived as the government’s
increasing interference with the secular way of life and the arena of personal choice.
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In this sense, the decision to build a shopping mall in Gezi Park was the last straw that
broke the camel’s back. The government, on the other hand, condemned the protests
as the work of a sinister international and national plot to oust Erdog˘an and his
government by non-electoral means. Among the culprits were unnamed foreign
enemies, the interest-rates lobby, and their violence-prone allies – ‘thugs’ as he called
them. Erdog˘an reacted by organising a series of mass meeting in order to mobilise his
own supporters and consolidate his base.
In any case, the Gezi Park events exacted a heavy toll on Turkey. First, they deepened
the already worrying degree of polarisation between the religious and secular sectors of
society, i.e. between the supporters and opponents of the AKP. Secondly, they hurt
Turkey’s international image as a prominent secular and democratic Muslim country
with the potential to serve as amodel for the rest of theMuslimworld, particularly for the
Arab Spring countries. As the President of the Republic, Abdullah Gu¨l, put it succinctly,
‘an image that you strive to build in ten years, can be destroyed in one week’ (Milliyet
2013b). Thirdly, and relatedly, the government’s strong reaction to the protesters invited
criticisms from the EU, the Council of Europe, and many Western circles, creating
further tensions in the already stumbling Turkey–EU accession negotiations.
The AKP’s shift towards conservatism and authoritarianism marked the end of the
long-time alliance between independent, non-party liberal democrats and religious
conservatives (S¸ahin 2008). The Gezi Park events were the culmination of the
increasingly cool relations between the two. The AKP, with its growing self-confidence
began to feel that it could safely ignore the intellectually important, but numerically
insignificant, liberals. Probably, the most frank and explicit admission of this parting
of the ways is found in the following statement by Aziz Babus¸cu, the chairman of the
powerful I˙stanbul provincial organisation of the AKP: ‘Those who were partners with
us in one way or another during our ten-year period of government will not be
partners with us during the next ten years. The future is a period of construction.
The construction period will not be to their liking. Therefore, those partners will not
be with us. Those who walked together with us yesterday in one way or the other,
tomorrow will be partners with the forces that are against us. Because the future that
will be constructed and the Turkey that will be built will not be a future and a period
which they will accept’ (Cengiz 2013). These statements have not been disowned or
contradicted by any member of the AKP’s top leadership.
Towards the end of the year 2013, the AKP received another serious blow with the
disclosure of a major criminal investigation involving the sons of three cabinet
ministers, the general director of a major state bank, and certain businessmen and
bureaucrats on corruption-related charges. The AKP leadership quickly reacted by
describing this as a sinister plot by international actors and their Turkish collaborators,
with the intention of discrediting and ousting the AKP government. By international
instigators was meant explicitly or implicitly the United States (US) and Israel, and by
‘their Turkish collaborators’ the Gu¨len movement. The latter, led by a former preacher,
Fethullah Gu¨len, who has been living in the US in self-imposed exile for many years,
is one of the most important and influential religious communities in Turkey, very
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active in the fields of education, media, publishing, and other business sectors (Yavuz
& Esposito 2003). The followers of the movement generally voted for the centre-right
parties in the 1980s and the 1990s, rather than for the Islamist Welfare Party (RP).
Since the formation of the AKP in 2001, however, they have collaborated closely with
it. The movement is believed to have a large number of supporters in the judiciary and
the police.
Relations between the AKP and the Gu¨len movement started to cool off from 2012,
as will be explained below. Both sides were careful, however, to hide their differences
from public eyes. With the disclosure of the above-mentioned corruption-related
criminal investigations on 17 December 2013, the conflict came out into the open.
Erdog˘an and his supporters immediately blamed the movement as the force behind
the conspiracy, portraying the police officers and public prosecutors involved in the
investigation as committed members of the Gu¨len movement. In a few days, the
conflict turned into an all-out war with no holds barred. Thus, Erdog˘an used unusually
strong words to refer to the movement, such as ‘spies’, ‘agents’, ‘sub-contractors’ of
foreign forces, ‘traitors’, ‘members of a gang’, ‘involved in political engineering’, ‘a state
within a state’, ‘a parallel state’, etc., and declared his intention of ‘entering their dens
and destroying them’ (Taraf 2013a). At the same time, the government engaged in a
large-scale purge of suspected pro-Gu¨len officers from the police force. This action is
generally viewed as an effort to interfere with the ongoing judicial process in order to
cover up the corruption charges.
On 25 December 2013, Erdog˘an announced a Cabinet reshuffle that involved ten
ministries, including the departure of the three ministers whose sons were the subject
of criminal investigation and a fourth who was himself the subject of corruption
charges. There were even charges against Erdog˘an himself and members of his family.
In fact, one of his sons was interrogated by a public prosecutor in this connection.
Although corruption has been a usual part of Turkey’s political life, the unprecedented
extent of the present allegations and the government’s efforts to cover them up
have seriously undermined the legitimacy of Turkey’s already fragile democracy.
The cabinet reshuffle was followed by two former ministers (I˙dris Naim S¸ahin and
Ertug˘rul Gu¨nay), who had nothing to do with the corruption charges, resigning from
the party. At the time of writing (in mid-April 2014), a total of ten deputies have
resigned from the party since the beginning of the recent crisis. Whatever the truth
behind the charges and the counter-charges, there is no doubt that this open conflict
between the AKP and the Gu¨len movement represents a much more serious and
politically damaging crack in the AKP coalition.
It is not clear what lies behind the sudden break between the AKP and Gu¨len
movement following their close collaboration for almost ten years. The first crack
appeared in 2012 when a public prosecutor called on Hakan Fidan, the chief of the
Turkish Intelligence Agency (MIT), to testify about his role in the secret negotiations
with Abdullah O¨calan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK (Partiya Karkereˆn Kurdistan
– Kurdistan Workers’ Party). The negotiations were taking place in Oslo, obviously
under the instructions of the government. The AKP government considered this a
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serious blow to its Kurdish policy and blamed the Gu¨len movement for trying
to torpedo the ‘peace process’. It is also likely that the government felt increasingly
restless about the growing influence of Gu¨len sympathisers within the police force
and judiciary. It reacted in Autumn 2013 by disclosing plans to close down preparatory
courses for university entrance exams, an area where the Gu¨len movement was very
active and from which it drew a great deal of income and social influence. The
movement’s response was the disclosure of the corruption charges mentioned above,
which in turn triggered the recent crackdown on the Gu¨len sympathisers.
Both during the Gezi Park events and the recent crisis involving the Gu¨len
movement, the AKP government chose a policy of confrontation by galvanising and
mobilising its core supporters around charges of a foreign conspiracy. It is doubtful,
however, whether this confrontational strategy will pay off electorally. The hard-core
Islamist supporters of the AKP have always been a minority of its voters. Thus, a 2002
pre-election survey showed that only 27.4 per cent of AKP voters had voted for the
Islamist-leaning Virtue Party (FP) in 1999. On the other hand, a surprisingly high 21.9
per cent had previously voted for the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party
(MHP), 9.2 per cent for the centre-right Motherland Party (ANAP), 7.3 per cent for
the centre-right True Path Party (DYP), and 6.9 per cent for the centre-left Democratic
Left Party (DSP) (TU¨SES 2002, pp. 70–71). Thus, the AKP had successfully brought
together former-centre-right voters, moderate I˙slamists, moderate nationalists, and
even a segment of the former centre-left, essentially rebuilding the O¨zal ANAP
coalition. The latter dated back to the end of the military rule of 1980–83, when ANAP
under the leadership of Turgut O¨zal built a similar coalition, which O¨zal often boasted
had brought together four major political tendencies. The coalition had emerged as a
clear victor from the 1983 transition elections with 45.2 per cent of the vote. In the
2007 and 2011 parliamentary elections, the AKP continued to grow at the expense of
centre-right parties that today are totally extinct. Such moderately conservative but
pragmatic former centre-right voters cannot be expected to respond positively to a
policy of confrontation and polarisation. By all estimates, the hard-core conservative
and/or Islamist voters do not constitute more than a quarter to a third of the total AKP
vote. Thus, even if a split within the AKP does not take place, a significant decline
in the AKP vote can be predicted. Furthermore, after the break with the Gu¨len
movement, religious appeals may no longer be as effective as before, even among the
AKP’s religiously conservative supporters.
The AKP and the Present State of Turkish Democracy
Turkey’s democratic record over the last three years has been mixed. On the positive
side, the most important development was the ceasefire with the PKK, the violent
Kurdish insurgent movement, since March 2013. The ceasefire was arranged through
the above-mentioned secret negotiations with the PKK leader, Abdullah O¨calan, who
has been in jail since 1999. The government’s response was the introduction of certain
modest reforms relating to the Kurdish question, as will be spelled out below.
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Other reforms involved the return of certain properties to non-Muslim (more
specifically, Greek and Armenian) charitable foundations, unlawfully taken away from
them in earlier decades, and certain improvements brought about by the so-called
third and fourth ‘judicial reform packages’ (Law No. 6352 dated 2 July 2012 and Law
No. 6459 dated 14 April 2013, respectively) (O¨zbudun and Tu¨rkmen 2013). Thus, the
European Commission’s 2013 Turkey Progress Report states that
the 3rd Judicial Reform Package, adopted in July 2012, started to produce results, in
particular as regards detention (including its length). The 4th Judicial Reform Package
provides judicial remedies for a numberof issues onwhichTurkeyhadbeen condemned
by the EuropeanCourt ofHumanRights. It narrowed the scope of terror-related crimes
by removing the link between the imparting of ideas through publications, statements,
speeches, etc., and theuse or threat of use of coercionor violence. If implemented in line
with European standards, those changes should have a positive impact on freedom of
expression. (European Commission 2013, pp. 12, 44–64)
Paradoxically, however, the impact of these legislative changes on the behaviour of the
courts has so far remained very limited.
Other modest but positive steps were announced by Prime Minister Erdog˘an on 30
September 2013 as a ‘democratisation package’ (O¨zbudun 2013b). The package raised
the possibility of lowering the current ten per cent national electoral threshold,
promised to lower the threshold for budget support to political parties from seven to
three per cent of the total vote cast, and promised to allow the conduct of political
activity in languages and dialects other than Turkish. The most important item with
regard to the Kurdish problem was to allow education in languages and dialects other
than Turkish in private schools. Predictably, the spokespersons for the PKK and its
political arm, the Peace and Democracy Party (Baris¸ ve Demokrasi Partisi – BDP),
found these reforms positive but insufficient. Independent Turkish and foreign
observers also generally thought that the package was below expectations.
On the negative side of the picture, one may mention long detention periods,
violations of the right to a fair trial, excessive and disproportionate use of police force
in demonstrations, financial and other pressures on media owners that have resulted
in considerable self-censorship and the firing of a number of critical journalists, and
the extremely vague and broad definitions of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist propaganda’ in
the Anti-Terror Law. Thousands of Kurdish activists, including elected local officials
and journalists, are on trial or in detention on the basis of this law.1 Freedom House
ratings place Turkey in the ‘partly free’ category. Turkey’s score on civil rights and
political rights showed an improvement in the mid-2000s, and remained stable at 3 for
several years but fell to 3 on political rights and 4 on civil rights in 2012 (Piano &
Puddington 2006, p. 123; Puddington 2010, p. 143; 2013, p. 51).2 These scores
accurately reflect the changes in Turkey’s democratic record. Thus, while a modest
improvement was recorded in the first two terms of the AKP government, a reverse
trend seems to have started during its third term.
These observations are generally shared by many Turkish and foreign analysts who
were sympathetic towards the AKP government during its first two terms in power. To
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cite a few examples, I˙hsan Dag˘ı, a leading Turkish professor of political science,
describes the current state of Turkish democracy not as an ‘illiberal democracy’ but as
‘post-modern authoritarianism’. ‘The difference between the two’, he argues, ‘is that in
the former a majority simply imposes its will on the rest, while in the latter the
majority legislates a particular way of life and uses the state apparatus to impose its
choice of morality, lifestyle and value system . . . In public debates and justification
of social and cultural policies, the party leader is increasingly relying on “values.”
He refers to them as “our national values,” “historical values,” “our civilisation” and
“values that our nation represents”’ (Dag˘ı 2012).
Similarly, Marc Pierini, who served as the EU representative in Turkey between 2006
and 2011, observes that ‘the ruling party has ramped up efforts to impose its own
religious-conservative views on society, using the majority it acquired in three
successive legislative elections as justification. The coexistence of different lifestyles is
not a goal. The government has responded to recent protests with a divisive narrative
and heavy-handed law-and-order policies. It has used aggressive language against
specific people, groups, and institutions both in Turkey and abroad . . . From a liberal
democracy perspective, the solution is not found exclusively in the ballot box . . . In
modern and diverse societies, conducting inclusive forms of dialogue and building
consensus is an essential part of advancing democracy. This is especially true in
Turkey, which is quite diverse in terms of beliefs, religious practices, and lifestyles’
(Pierini 2013, pp. 1, 4).
There is a wide grey area between fully institutionalised and consolidated liberal
democracies and outright authoritarian regimes, or ‘hybrid regimes’.3 The current
state of the Turkish political regime can best be described as a ‘delegative democracy’
(DD), as Guillermo O’Donnell puts it (O’Donnell 1994), or as a ‘plebiscitarian
democracy.’
O’Donnell developed his notion of DD chiefly on the basis of the experience of Latin
American presidential systems. Delegative democracies, he argues, ‘are not
consolidated (i.e. institutionalised) democracies, but they may be enduring. In many
cases, there is no sign either of any imminent threat of an authoritarian regression,
or of advances toward representative democracy.’ In contrast to representative
(or institutionalised) democracies, they are marked by a highly personalistic style of
leadership ( personalismo): ‘DD is strongly majoritarian. It consists in constituting,
through clear elections, amajority that empowers someone to become the embodiment
and interpreter of the high interests of the nation . . . Elections in DDs are a very
emotional and high-stakes event: candidates compete for a chance to rule virtually free
of all constraints . . . After the election, voters/delegators are expected to become a
passive but cheering audience of what the president does’ (O’Donnell 1994, p. 60).
A related feature of the DD is the weakness of ‘horizontal accountability’,
i.e. accountability to other autonomous institutions of the state such as the legislature
or the courts. Such accountability is seen by the President as a ‘nuisance’ and an
impediment to fulfilling his/her mission: ‘In institutionalised democracies, account-
ability runs not only vertically, making elected officials answerable to the ballot box, but
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also horizontally, across a network of relatively autonomous powers (i.e. other
institutions). Vertical accountability, alongwith the freedom to form parties and to try to
influence public opinion, exists in both representative and delegative democracies. But
the horizontal accountability characteristic of representative democracy is extremely
weak or nonexistent in delegative democracies. Furthermore, since the institutions
that make horizontal accountability effective are seen by delegative presidents as
unnecessary encumbrances to their “mission,” theymake strenuous efforts to hamper the
development of such institutions’ (O’Donnell 1994, pp. 61–62).
Many years ago, I argued that the type of democracy that fits the Turkish case best is
DD (O¨zbudun 2000, pp. 151–153). This statement seems even more valid today than
it was in earlier decades. Erdog˘an’s style of leadership, particularly in his third term in
office, bears clear marks of personalismo, with a strong sense of mission and an
excessive concentration of authority in his hands. Parallel to this, he sees the ballot box
(i.e. vertical accountability) as the only instrument of accountability and the only
source of democratic legitimacy. ‘National will’, as expressed through the ballot box,
is elevated to a nearly sacred status. Instruments of horizontal accountability,
always weak in Turkish politics, have further weakened. Thus, the strong, loyal, and
disciplined AKP majority in parliament makes accountability to the legislature
ineffective. The powers of the Court of Accounts, responsible for supervising
government spending in the name of parliament, were curtailed. Pressures over media
owners and other civil society actors have been pointed out above. But perhaps the
most ominous recent development concerns the judiciary.
As referred to above, the 2010 constitutional amendments broke the monopoly of
the ultra-secularist judges over the higher echelons of the judiciary and gave the
Constitutional Court and the HSYK a more representative and pluralist structure.
As such, these reforms were strongly supported by Turkish liberals and were
commented upon favourably by the relevant European institutions. However, the
government apparently was not happy with the results, regarding the HSYK, where a
strong majority of members were judges elected by their peers, as closer to the Gu¨len
movement than to the government.
The tension between the government and the Gu¨len movement erupted into a real
crisis with the 17 December 2013 revelations concerning corruption charges. Erdog˘an
and other AKP spokespersons quickly blamed the prosecutors as ‘agents’ and ‘guilty’
and issued a government regulation making some radical changes in the rules
governing the role of the judicial police (members of the police force employed
in criminal investigations under the authority of public prosecutors) in criminal
investigations. When the HSYK responded with a declaration criticising the regulation,
Erdog˘an declared them ‘guilty’ too and stated that he would have immediately put the
HSYK members on trial if he had had the power to do so. He also admitted that the
AKP hadmade a mistake in 2010 by changing the structure of the HSYK (Taraf 2013b).
At the same time, the government engaged in a large-scale purge of suspected
pro-Gu¨len officers in the police. Also, about 100 judges and public prosecutors
involved in the corruption investigations were transferred to less sensitive posts. Even
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more ominously, a law was adopted (Law no. 6524) on 15 February 2014 that radically
changed the structure of the HSYK and transferred many critical powers of the Plenary
of the Council to the Minister of Justice. This is clearly a step backwards from the
constitutional amendment of 2010, which had been highly praised in European circles
and is inconsistent with the present Article 159 of the Constitution. Many provisions of
this law were found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in its ruling of 10
April 2014. In mid-February, parliament adopted another highly controversial bill
severely restricting access to the internet, again strongly opposed by all other parties in
Turkey and criticised by EU institutions.
The recent downward trend in Turkey’s democracy record is also observed in the
2014 Freedom in the World report of Freedom House. While Turkey maintained the
same scores of 3 and 4 in 2013, it received ‘a downward trend arrow due to the harsh
government crackdown on protesters in I˙stanbul and other cities and increased political
pressure on private companies to conform with the ruling party’s agenda . . . In his
early years in power, Erdog˘an was widely praised . . . for introducing overdue reforms.
Then came a period in which reform efforts seemed to stall. More recently, key
democratic institutions have faced intense pressure, and basic civil liberties experienced
setbacks’ (Freedom House 2014a, pp. 14–22).
The same report also refers to Turkey as a case of ‘modern authoritarianism’, which
it describes as follows:
While freedom suffered from coups and civil wars during the year, an equally
significant phenomenon was the reliance on more subtle, but ultimately more
effective, techniques by those who practice what is known as modern
authoritarianism. Such leaders devote full-time attention to the challenge of
crippling the opposition without annihilating it, and flouting the rule of law while
maintaining a plausible veneer of order, legitimacy, and prosperity. Central tomodern
authoritarian strategy is the capture of institutions that undergird political pluralism.
The goal is to dominate not only the executive and legislative branches, but also the
media, the judiciary, civil society, the economy, and the security forces . . . The past
year was notable for an intensification of efforts to control political messages through
domination of themedia and the use of legal sanctions to punish vocal critics . . . [I]n
Turkey, a range of tactics have been employed to minimise criticisms of Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an. They include jailing reporters (Turkey leads the
world in the number of imprisoned journalists), pressuring independent publishers
to sell their holdings to government cronies, and threatening media owners with
reprisals if critical journalists are not silenced. (Freedom House 2014a, p. 3)
Freedom House’s more recent special report, entitled ‘Democracy in Crisis: Corruption,
Media, and Power in Turkey’, focuses on government–media relations. The report starts
with the sentence, ‘Turkey’s democracy is in crisis,’ and goes on to say that
‘This report focuses on one element of the crisis in Turkey’s democracy: the
government’s increasing pressure on the media over the last seven years. While
acknowledging that Turkey’s current crisis is bigger and more systemic, Freedom
House believes it is important to analyze in depth the government’s efforts to
marginalise and suppress independent voices and reporting in Turkey’s media. A free
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press is a vital actor in any democracy, providing accountability and encouraging a
healthy public debate. In Turkey, with a weak opposition and judiciary, an unfettered
press is essential. The muzzling of the press in the last seven years has contributed to
the wide disjuncture between citizens and their government. It is both a symptom
and a cause of the current crisis . . . As reflected in Freedom House’s annual
ratings . . . Turkey is not a dictatorship. It is a country where different views are
expressed and heard, with a vibrant and diverse civil society. But it remains a country
where criticising the government means risking your livelihood, your reputation,
and sometimes your freedom. And at the present moment, it is a country where
the government is behaving more, rather than less, authoritarian. (Freedom House
2014b, pp. 3–4)
Thus, the present conflict has the potential to turn into a real ‘legitimacy’ crisis with
consequences that are hard to predict.Much depends on the electoral performance of the
AKP. The 30 March 2014 local elections took place in an exceedingly polarised and
confrontational atmosphere and turned into a nationwide vote of confidence or non-
confidence in the AKP and Erdog˘an. The result for the AKP was neither a clear victory
nor a clear defeat. The AKP clearly emerged as the leading party with about 44 per cent of
the vote. On the other hand, its vote share fell by about six per cent of the total vote
compared with the 49.8 per cent the party won in the parliamentary election of 2011.
Such performance forebodes an evenmore polarised and hard-to-predict competition in
the presidential elections of August 2014, where the winning candidate must obtain an
absolute majority of the votes on either the first or the second round. The present level of
support makes Erdog˘an’s election a risky prospect, even though at the moment he seems
to be willing to take this risk. A second possible scenario is that he may decide to remain
as the prime minister and nominate Gu¨l for a second term in the presidency. At a more
fundamental level, however, possible scenarios are a return to democratic reforms with a
more inclusionary political discourse, a further drift towards authoritarianism, and a
split within the AKP. As stated at the outset, it is not clear which way the cat will jump.
Notes
1. For an evaluation of Turkey’s recent human rights record, see European Commission 2013; Pierini
2013; Edelman et al. 2013. Even though the last report focuses on Turkey’s foreign policy under
AKP rule, it also contains valuable insights into the AKP’s ideology. The recent ideological shift
towards Islamism in foreign policy has a parallel in domestic politics as alluded to above.
2. Freedom House rates countries’ democratic performance on two scales: political rights and civil
rights. Countries are rated on a scale from 1 to 7 with 1 indicating the best and 7 the worst scores.
Countries that score between 1 and 2.5 are rated as ‘free’, between 3 and 5.5 as ‘partly free’, and
between 5.5 and 7 as ‘not free’.
3. Diamond 2002; Schedler 2002; 2006, pp.36–50; Levitsky & Way 2002.
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